MAXUEJING/CHINADAILY
Thestressintheglobalbankingsystemisleadingsometodrawparallelswiththelastbankingcrisis.Thereare,ofcourse,cleardifferencesaroundthenatureofthebankingstressitself.Whilethe2006-08crisiswasmoreexplicitlyacreditcrisis,thistimeithasbeenmoreaninterestrateriskcrisis.
(资料图片仅供参考)
Smallerbanksarestrugglingtocompeteondeposits,withfront-endrateshavingbeenhikedsharply,andarealsofacingsharplossesontheirfixed-incomeassets,whichthewithdrawalofdepositsisexposing.
The2008GlobalFinancialCrisisbuiltslowly,withhousingpricesbeginningtofallin2006,hedgefundssaddledwithsubprimeinvestmentsbeginningtofailin2007,andfull-blownbankingfailuresin2008.Despiteclearsignsofstressbymid-2007,Asiancurrenciesactuallycontinuedtorallyforafewquarters,withover5percentgainsonanaverageAsianforeignexchangeindexfromJuly2007-Mar2008,beforeasharpturnandover15percentlossesintheyearthereafter.
TherewasofcoursevariationinhowAsiancurrenciesperformedeveninthemidstofthecrisis.WenotethatfromSummer2007-End2008,theJapaneseyen,ChineseyuanandSingaporedollaractuallymanagedtodelivernetpositivegains,whiletheRepublicofKoreawon,IndianrupeeandtheIndonesianrupiahlostthemostground.
CrucialdifferencesintheAsianFXbackdrop
Therearealotofareastominewhenitcomestoparallelswithhistory.Weidentifyanumberofcrucialdifferencesbetween2007-08andtodaythatsuggestthatAsiancurrenciesarelikelytofaremuchbetterthistime:
1.ForeignpositioninginAsianassetsismuchlighter,withconsiderableoutflowsfromAsianequitiesinrecentyearsincontrasttotheyearsofinflowsfrom2002-07.
InthefiveyearsbeforeSummer2007,Asianequitieshadattracted$136billionofinflows,orover1percentoftheGDPofthecountriescovered,whileoverthepast5years,Asianequitieshavelost$120billion,or0.3percentofGDP.Foreigninvestorsaresimplyfarlessinvestedandexposed,havingrefrainedfrombuildingpositionsinthelastfewyears.
2.CorporatepositioningisalsolongUSdollarnow,unlikeshortUSdollarin2007.
AsiancorporateshavehoardedUSdollardepositsinrecentyears,incontrasttotheheavyshortUSdollarforwardpositionsin2007.Theyearpreceding2007hadseenaconsistentdowntrendinUSdollar/Asia,withdomesticcorporatesactivelypositionedshortUSdollar.
3.LessrisksofUSdollarfundingstress.
TheemergenceofbankingsystemriskshavebeenaccompaniedbyfarlessUSdollarstressthistime.WhileUSdollarfundingpremiumshaverisen,itiswellbelowlevelsseenin2020,andjustafractionofwhatoccurredin2008.ThisispartlybecauseforeigninvestorsandcorporatesaremuchlessshortUSdollartobeginwithandthusthescrambleforUSdollarhasalsobeenmorelimited.Butitisalsopartlyduetohigherlevelsofforeignexchangereserves,andaccesstoemergencyUSdollarliquidityfromtheFedviatheforeignandinternationalmonetaryauthorities"repofacility,whichappearstohavebeentappedrecentlyforupto$60billion,albeititisunclearhowmuchAsiancentralbankshaveplayedarole.
4.China"sexpectedstrongrecoverythisyearandnextwillprovideanoffset,particularlyforASEANwheresomecountriesaremoreleveragedtoChinaoverUSgrowthnow,especiallyserviceexporters.
TheChineseeconomyisexpectedtoacceleratefromthisyearitself,giventhereopeningandpropertymarketreversal,withDeutscheBankHouseViewexpecting6.0percentand6.3percentgrowthin2023and2024.Thisshouldprovideahelpfuloffset,particularlytoAsianeconomiesthataremoreleveragedtoChinesethanUSgrowth.
WelookatasimplecorrelationbetweendomesticmanufacturingPMIsandChinaversusUSPMIs.WefindthatanumberofASEANeconomies-Malaysia,thePhilippines,ThailandandVietnam—areallmorecorrelatedtoChinathanUSgrowthnow,whileNorthAsianeconomiescouldfaceabiggerdragfromtheUSthanliftfromChina.Whilethereareclearrelativeimplicationsformanufacturingstrength,wethinkthebrightspotoftheChineserecoverywillbeinservicesconsumption,withThailandsettobenefitthemostfromthistrendasChinesetourismspendingresumes.
5.Asiancurrenciesaremuchmoreattractivelyvalued.
InSummer2007,Asiancurrenciesweredecidedlyovervaluedbyanaverageof13percentonourTradeWeightedIndextrade-basedmodels.Incomparison,Asiancurrenciesonaveragearenowslightlyundervalued.
6.MoststrikingsimilaritybetweenthenandnowwillbearoundJapanandyen"sstrength.
Evenin2006,theBankofJapantightenedaftertheFedhaddelivereditslasthikeandcrackswerebeginningtoappear.ButwhilethelastBoJtighteningcyclewasveryshort-lived,andquicklyreversed,wethinkthisonewillhavemorevirtuousandsustainabledomesticdrivers.In2006,whentheBoJliftedrates,coreinflationwasstillnegativeandheadlineinflationlessthan1percent.Incontrast,Japanappearstohavemadeamoremeaningfulexitfromitslowinflationregimethistime,withShuntowageincreasesthelargestsincetheearly1990sinMarch2023.
Takingtheabovefactorstogether,wewouldnoteaweakercasetoplaythisbankingcrisisvialongUSdollar/Asiapositionscomparedwith2007-08.Incontrasttothen,realpositioningappearsverylightwithdomesticcorporatessittingonlongUSdollarandforeigninvestorshavingavoidedbuildingAsianexposureinrecentyears.Asiancurrenciesarealsomostlycheap,theriskofUSdollarfundingstressismuchlower,andChinaisrecoveringstrongly.
Ourrelativecurrencypreferencesmostlyreflectthedriversdiscussedabove.WenotethatexportsfrommarketssuchastheRepublicofKoreahavebeenverypoor,andaslowingUSeconomycouldaddtothedrag;MalaysiaismeanwhilemoreleveragedtoChina"sgrowthrecovery.WeseeThailandgettingaboostlaterintheyearfromagreaterreturnofChinesetourism.WealsoseegrowthandmonetarypolicydivergenceleadingtostrengthintheChineseyuanagainsttheUSdollarthisyear.
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